In 2002 there were complaints by the locals in the Bauchi-Gombe and Adamawa-Borno axes, northern Nigeria, that some people were seen several times walking into the forest with live ammunition. It was suggested these boys could be undergoing some sort of military training. Like lots of other problems, unrelated to oil, elections or budget, those incidents were mostly left uninvestigated.

Most people in these settlements were after all farmers and local traders. However, in 2009, in the period of Boko Haram’s most violent uprising, it became crystal clear that there was no turning back, no hiding place. Terrorism was here to stay. The explosions that rocked the police force headquarters in Abuja, the UN building, a Catholic church on Christmas day, a bus park in Nyanya, and a shopping mall in the heart of Abuja were among the first stages of what has become the largest terrorist group in West Africa. However, then the towns Baga, Bama, Gwoza, Monguno, Mubi and parts of Maiduguri fell under the hands of insurgents and were proclaimed part of their Caliphate. It became clear that Nigeria had to deal with a monster capable to completely engulf it.

In February 2015, I was privileged to attend a private brief with Kabiru Tanimu Turaki, Nigeria’s minister of special duties. At the brief, Mr Turaki maintained that a series of avoidable events led to the expansion and growth of Boko Haram. The group, which in 2014 declared certain parts of Nigeria under its control, is responsible for the deaths of over 18,000 Nigerians.

Growth and local response

As a result of both ongoing worldwide efforts against the organization and senior leadership losses, Al Qaeeda’s core leadership structure was significantly degraded limiting its ability to conducting attacks and guiding its followers. Subsequently, year 2013 saw the rise of increasingly aggressive and autonomous affiliates and like-minded groups in the Middle East and Africa. They took advantage of the weak governance and instability in the region to strengthen their influence. These affiliates have later discovered Nigeria as a terrorist haven.

At first, almost subtly, sleeper cells and small guerilla attacks were carried out on locals at frequent intervals. However, Nigerian military was busy dragging its feet. Several factors played a key role to this response. Unfamiliar with this form of engagement, the army was, perhaps, unwilling to take up arms against Nigerians, against northerners, and, in some cases, against their fellow Muslims. The biggest lapse was the absence of intelligence.

Weapons and intelligence

Long before the military carried out its first major offensive in Borno, the number of arms noted in possession of the rebels had caused too many unanswered questions. During the private brief, Kabiru Turaki Tanimu stated that the amount of funding the rebels had been gathering from Al-Qaeeda in the Islamic Maghreb was at the time unknown to Nigerian military. Even students where secretly recruited at the local madrassahs and universities in several northern states and often funded to take technical skill courses in Sudan. The first wave of attacks on police stations across the country indicated that Boko Haram had begun training its members in tactical attack sequences using guerilla warfare. Even then, there was not enough intelligence to pinpoint the channels the funding was coming from.

Another vital problem was Nigerians’ response to a highly functional military. Since the dawn of democracy, most politicians and presidents, even of military background, have been sceptical of Nigerian military. This attitude has culminated in Nigerian military’s major weapons handicap. Undoubtedly, there are also cases of corruption within the army procurement ranks responsible for cutting down the funding regularly allocated for the military improvement.

Faced with these challenges, Nigerian military has begun to press its foreign alliances for arms supply. The Leahy Amendment was one of the major setbacks to the acquisition of arms from the US by the Nigerian military. There were many evidences restraining the US from supplying the Nigerian government with so much needed weapons. Among them are heavy handedness by the Nigerian military documented by the Human Rights Watch in 2013 and an interview granted by the military spokesperson, General Chris Olukolade, to CNN reporter Issey Sesay in May 2013.

Porous borders and arms smuggling

In 2014, a report from the Nigeria Immigration Service stated there were over 1,400 unmanned routes from several parts of northern Nigeria into countries without gun control measures. One could drive all the way from Sokoto-Niger axis to Somalia, home to Bakara market (the largest arms black market within the West African hemisphere). Border patrol has become lax over the years as there wasn’t sufficient funding to take effective measures against these lapses.

Boko Haram, along with its rumoured splinter group commonly known as Ansaru, started crossing Nigeria’s borders to neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger to evade pressure and conduct operations.

Apart from the arms and insurgents, another problem the Nigerian military faced was that of support from neighboring countries. Before the formation of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTU) and the African Union (AU) offensive declaration in January 2015, Niger, Cameroun and Chad remained reluctant to grant the Nigerian military the “right of forceful pursuit” into several communities the insurgents were known to retreat to. This attitude has seen the growth of insurgent cells within the reach of Nigeria’s border states where attacks on the locals were often carried out.

External support and infiltration

It became clear long ago that Boko Haram had begun to take radical actions to fund its operations. They were found engaged in a range of criminal activities to raise the needed funds. Kidnapping for ransom along with the private donations from the Gulf remained the major sources of illicit funding.

Sheikh Jafar, a notable preacher in the northern Nigerian city of Kano and teacher of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf, was among those who began to warn local scholars against receiving funding from foreign donors from the Gulf. In the morning on April 13, 2007, Sheikh Jafar was shot also met the same fate. It was clear that Boko Haram members and sympathizers had immersed significantly in the Nigerian society.

Within the military ranks, dissent and suspicion were also on the rise. It isn’t clear if this information can be verified, but some officials have reported that in January 2015, the night before the fall of Baga, the Nigerian military had prepared an offensive team after receiving information about an imminent attack. By dawn, all the batteries in the armored tanks meant to counter the insurgents had been removed. It could have been the first major in-house operation leading the military to begin inside investigation against itself. Army personnel also rumored that their colleagues were routed through ambushes on the routes only known and communicated internally.

All these problems saw Nigeria engaged in almost helpless bid to get rid of terrorism for close to a decade. However, the situation has improved today. Of course, Abubakar Shekau is still at large enjoying being ranked by TIME magazine as one of 100 most influential personalities this April. Of course, Chibok girls are still in captivity, and the recent bomb explosion in Yobe makes its crystal clear that Boko Haram is still very much alive. But the military’s responses over the last few months have been commendable. With weapons sourced from Eastern Europe, training from South African mercenaries, and the efforts of the MNJTU, Boko Haram has incurred significant losses and seems to be in steep decline, perhaps, even extinction.

These events, however, demonstrate to Nigeria’s government that terrorism and insurgency will for some time remain one of the most significant modern challenges. Whatever government takes over the affairs of Nigeria, it should do so with the intention of making security a top priority among all other objectives. It should maintain a well-funded, well-trained and well-equipped military capable of handling the complexities of modern warfare.

All this will equip the military for the challenges ahead. Boko Haram may soon be a story of the past, but what of Biafra sympathizers holding meetings in several countries in the world? What about the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND)? And, finally, where is Abubakar Shekau?

This article expresses the author’s opinion only. The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily represent those of Naij.com or its editors. 

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