Since Africa is the primary focus of many United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, it is crucial that its voice is heard in the review of these operations. The changing security context, with much more complex crises than before, and the growing number of peace operations being launched by the African Union (AU) have to be taken into account. Somalia, where the UN is backing the AU-led operation, is an example of possible models of UN–AU cooperation.
On 23 April, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to review the report of the chairperson of the AU Commission on the African position on the review of UN peace operations.
The ongoing review of UN peace operations by the UN High-Level Panel established by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2014 is of huge policy, institutional and political significance to Africa and the AU. For the UN, more than any other part of the world, developments in Africa have a significant impact on its peace operations.
These considerations informed the decision of the AU (as contained in the AU 24th summit outcome document) and its member states to articulate an African position for consideration by the panel. This is in addition to the views that the AU and member states shared during the UN High-Level Panel’s weeklong visit to Addis Ababa on the review of UN peace operations in February 2015.
Africa hosts more peacekeeping or peace support operations than any other continent
No part of the world features more prominently in the work of the UN Security Council (UNSC) than Africa. The UNSC dedicates more than 60% of its agenda to African issues. Africa also hosts more peacekeeping or peace support operations than any other continent. Of the 16 ongoing UN peacekeeping operations in the world, nine are in Africa. In terms of personnel numbers and budget size, the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations are in Africa.
Complex security challenges
A lot has changed in the African security landscape since the earlier review of UN peacekeeping by Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, captured in what is known as the Brahimi report of 2000. While some important aspects of the current security challenges do not differ from those of the 1990s, the context and complexity of today’s security issues present qualitatively different challenges. Terrorism, insurgency and transnational organised crime have risen to prominence, including in the various conflict areas in which UN peace operations are being conducted. They present asymmetric and hybrid security challenges. These changing features of the security landscape have come to stretch UN peacekeeping to its limits. As the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the AU mission in Somalia and the UN and AU missions in Mali and the Central African Republic have shown, these dynamics have placed particular strain on the traditional principles of multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping, most notably the use of force and consent.
Peace enforcement vs peacekeeping
As a result some missions have engaged in activities that are traditionally defined as combat or, more accurately, peace enforcement. As far as the AU and the UN are concerned, this has created a major doctrinal gap. While the AU uses the term ‘peace operations’ for its missions, the UN’s preferred terminology is ‘peacekeeping’. While the AU doctrine requires it to deploy troops even in the absence of a peace to keep, the UN doctrine bars it from deploying peacekeepers where there is no peace to keep. Accordingly, one of the areas of reform that interest the AU and its member states is the need to bridge the gap between UN doctrine and the demands of the security context to which peace operations are expected to respond.
While the AU uses the term ‘peace operations’ for its missions, the UN’s preferred terminology is ‘peacekeeping’
There is recognition among African states and at the AU that some kind of reform of the UN doctrine on the use of force and consent is necessary. Notably, it has become clear that ‘peace enforcement’ mandates are no guarantee of success. As the Somalia experience showed, it is important that the mandating and implementation of strategic use of force should be linked with political processes aimed at ending the conflict and be strategically directed to give effect to these processes.
Need for African views in UN decision-making
Additionally, unlike the 1990s and the early 2000s, today the AU and regional economic communities have emerged as the major peace and security actors on the continent. Since the AU has come into existence it has deployed more than half a dozen peace operations in Africa. Today, African states are the single largest regional contributors to UN peacekeeping, with Ethiopia the fourth-largest troop-contributing country in the world. The majority of personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa come from African states. In this regard, there is a need for greater representation and consideration of the views of the AU and African member states in UN decision-making processes on peace support operations on the continent.
Due to the nature of the security challenges found today, no single entity can effectively address them. As such (and as repeatedly pointed out during the week-long visit of the UN High-Level Panel to Addis Ababa), more needs to be done to both address the challenges in the UN–AU partnership and take it to a higher and more strategic level. While the UN and the AU have made significant progress in developing an increasingly functional working relationship over the past seven years with respect to peacekeeping, the perennial problem that this partnership has not been able to resolve is the question of sharing the burden of financing AU-led and UN-authorised peacekeeping operations.
More than just about funding peacekeepers
As AU officials and documents on the subject have pointed out, this issue is about more than funding peace operations, and has a direct impact on the global collective security system anchored in the UN Charter. While it is acknowledged that the AU should mobilise funds for its own operations, the UN and by extension the wider international community also bear responsibility for peace and security in Africa by virtue of the UN’s 1945 Charter, which makes the UN responsible for international peace and security.
Since addressing the peace and security challenges in Africa directly enhances international peace and security, other members of the international community should share this burden. To the extent that the African Peace and Security Architecture builds on and shares the burden of the global collective security system, it is incumbent upon the UN to share the burden of Africa’s efforts in maintaining peace and security. This is particularly true in cases where the UNSC has not assumed full responsibility but has instead authorised the deployment of AU responses to deal with situations that the UNSC deems to constitute a threat to international peace and security.
Peacekeeping is a collective endeavour and requires that its burden be shared
Somalia an example of shared responsibilities
At a practical level, peacekeeping is a collective endeavour and requires that its burden be shared. It was this appreciation of the shared nature of peacekeeping that led the UN to establish the UN Support Operation to AMISOM (UNSOA), based on UN-assessed contributions for providing institutionalised logistical support to AMISOM.
This model involves a satisfactory level of burden sharing by offering predictable and sustainable support to an AU operation and thereby making the endeavour a truly collaborative undertaking. This is an optimal model for dividing labour between the UN and the AU in situations where the UN would not by itself undertake peacekeeping operations. As such the use of UN-assessed contributions for providing institutionalised logistic support to UN-authorised AU missions should not be excluded. There should be willingness to make use of this model on a case-by-case basis, with the caveat that it does not entail automatic UN support for or a blank check to the AU whenever the latter deploys peace support operations.
Despite the fact that the AU and the UN have used a number of peacekeeping partnership models, no thorough and systematic discussions have been held on identifying more effective and mutually satisfactory models.
Areas of tensions between the UN and the AU
Apart from doctrinal differences, financing and the lack of an agreed-upon peacekeeping partnership model, there are a number of other areas of tension between the AU and the UN that the AU and its member states would like the UN review to address. These include divergent perceptions of the nature of conflict situations, different interpretations of norms such as the protection of civilians, and the role and participation of troop-contributing countries and regional actors in key decisions on UN peacekeeping and other peace support operations undertaken in Africa.
For African states and the AU, areas of particular concern include the attention and resources provided for both conflict prevention (including addressing the root causes of conflict) and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). Thus far both the AU and the UN have tended in practice to make much more use of peacekeeping operations than conflict prevention and PCRD. Additionally, less diplomatic capital and resources are allocated to conflict-prevention efforts and PCRD than to conflict management efforts involving the deployment of troops. Accordingly, there is an expectation that the review will also address conflict prevention and PCRD issues, including the design and application of UN political offices and peace-building missions.
The article was first published by The Institute for Security Studies (http://www.issafrica.org) and is republished with permission granted to www.oasesnews.com
